Security Isn't a Feature—It's Architecture
Nothing is true. Everything is permitted. Except shipping code with SQL injection in 2025—that's just lazy.
Think for yourself. Question authority. Especially the authority that says "we'll add security later."
Security isn't something you bolt on after writing vulnerable code. It's architectural. It's design. It's every line you write.
ILLUMINATION: Every line of code is a potential vulnerability. Every dependency is trust you can't verify.
Here's how we build code without backdoors—on purpose. Full methodology in our public Secure Development Policy:
The Five Practices of Not Shipping Vulns
1. Threat Model First
Design with adversaries in mind. What can go wrong? What are we doing about it? Answer before writing code, not after.
Code written without threat modeling is just bug creation with optimism.
2. Secure by Default
Default configurations should be secure. Users shouldn't have to know what flags make things safe. Safe should be the default.
If secure configuration requires reading docs, most deployments are insecure.
3. Least Privilege
Every process, every user, every component—minimum necessary permissions. Privilege escalation is harder when you start with nothing.
Root by default is convenience for attackers, not users.
4. Input Validation
Trust nothing from users, APIs, databases, files. Validate, sanitize, escape. SQL injection isn't clever—it's inexcusable.
All input is hostile until proven otherwise. User input is especially hostile.
5. Output Encoding
XSS happens because output isn't encoded. Context-aware escaping. HTML entity encoding. It's not hard—it's discipline.
XSS in 2025 means you didn't use your framework's built-in protections.
Secure SDLC: Security at Every Stage
Security integrated throughout development, not bolted on at the end:
- Design — Threat modeling, security requirements, architecture review
- Development — Secure coding standards, linters, IDE security plugins
- Testing — Unit tests for security properties, SAST, DAST, dependency scanning
- Review — Security-focused code review, pen testing, bug bounties
- Deployment — Secure configuration, secrets management, least privilege
- Operations — Monitoring, logging, incident response, patching
META-ILLUMINATION: Security after deployment is incident response. Security during development is prevention.
Dependency Hell: Trust You Can't Verify
Modern applications are mostly dependencies. Every dependency is trust you can't fully verify:
- Vet Dependencies — Check maintainer reputation, update frequency, known vulns
- Pin Versions — Exact versions, not ranges. Reproducible builds.
- Monitor for Vulns — Automated scanning, CVE monitoring, patch fast
- Minimize Dependencies — Every library is attack surface. Do you really need it?
- Supply Chain Security — SBOM, signed artifacts, provenance tracking
Operation Mindfuck the supply chain attackers: Minimize dependencies, pin versions, scan everything, patch fast.
ULTIMATE ILLUMINATION: The most secure code is code you didn't write. The most vulnerable code is code someone else wrote that you blindly trust.
Welcome to Chapel Perilous: Secure Coding Edition
Nothing is true. Everything is permitted. Except shipping known vulns—that's malpractice.
Secure development is discipline, not magic. Threat model. Validate input. Encode output. Scan dependencies. Test security properties. It's not hard—it's habit.
Think for yourself. Don't blindly trust frameworks, libraries, or "best practices." Verify. Test. Break your own code before attackers do.
All hail Eris! All hail Discordia!
"Think for yourself, schmuck! Question everything—especially code that hasn't been threat modeled."
— Hagbard Celine, Captain of the Leif Erikson 🍎 23 FNORD 5